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Colombiaa b s t r a c t
Both policymakers and scholars have suggested that informal land tenure contributes to the perpetuation
of illicit drug crop cultivation and, conversely, that land formalization programs serve counternarcotics
aims. This article examines some of the key causal mechanisms said to underlie the posited relationship
between land tenure (in)formality and the cultivation of crops used for illicit drug production. Our anal-
ysis is grounded in the context of Puerto Asís, Colombia – one of the most important coca-producing
municipalities in a country that produces the majority of the world’s cocaine. The case study is based
on extensive fieldwork in Puerto Asís, including in-depth interviews with peasants who cultivate(d) coca,
community leaders and local officials. We found: (i) that informal and semiformal institutions provide a
basic level of land tenure security for both those with and without state-recognized property titles; (ii)
that peasants invest considerable amounts of money and labor in their farms and community infrastruc-
tures, despite lacking formal land titles; (iii) that coca cultivation itself is a comparatively costly invest-
ment, with eighteen months minimum before payback; (iv) that peasants’ access to credit is not
conditioned on them having a formal land title; (v) that bank loans do not make people less dependent
on coca cultivation; and that (vi) farmers find it difficult to survive with legal livelihoods and thus per-
manently exit the coca economy for a long list of reasons, which are not addressed via land titling and
registration programs. These findings are contrary to popular policy narratives. We conclude that formal
titles are an important tool for Colombian peasant farmers to defend their land against powerful external
actors but will not necessarily serve the purposes commonly presented in the literature on illicit drugs.
 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
‘‘With land formalization, the replanting of coca is zero per
cent” (Agencia Nacional de Tierras, 2018a). This is the striking
headline of an article on the Colombian National Land Agency
webpage, praising the Formalize to Substitute counternarcotics
program. The article provides no details about the ‘‘zero per cent”
claim, which sounds (and probably is) too good to be true.
The Colombian government launched Formalize to Substitute in
2016, in alliance with the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC). The program is part of wider efforts to ensure that
Colombia’s campesinos (peasant farmers) have legal rights to the
lands they cultivate, but specifically ‘‘focalizes land formalization
activities in territories with illicit crops” (UNODC, 2016). Accordingto Emilio Archila, the Presidential Advisor for Stabilization and
Consolidation, ‘‘Formalize to Substitute is absolutely magical,
because a family, once they have the title for their land, can access
credit [. . .] but also that person doesn’t return to [coca] cultivation,
ever again” (Semana TV, 2020, 40:00 min). Similarly, the former
Director of the National Land Agency, claimed that land formaliza-
tion is ‘‘the best motivation and stimulus so that families maintain
their plots free of coca” (Agencia Nacional de Tierras, 2018a).
Notwithstanding the popularity of the idea that land formalization
reduces illicit crop cultivation, understanding of how tenure (in)-
formality influences people’s decisions to grow these crops is
limited.
This article contributes to nascent discussions on the relation-
ship between property rights and illicit crop production through
an analysis of evidence from Puerto Asís, Putumayo – a major
coca-producing area in southern Colombia. We use fieldwork
observations, interviews and survey data to scrutinize the most
popular rationale for incorporating land formalization into
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enabling investment in licit livelihoods. So far as we know, this is
the first systematic qualitative case study of the relationship
between illicit drug crop cultivation and land tenure (in)formality.
Our key case-study findings can be summarized as follows.
First, informal/semiformal tenure systems in Puerto Asís work rel-
atively well and local institutions provide a basic level of tenure
security for landholders, regardless of whether they have a state-
recognized title. Second, many of the peasants we interviewed
have invested considerable amounts of money and labor in their
farms and community infrastructures, despite lacking formal land
titles. And, contrary to what is often implied, coca cultivation itself
is a comparatively costly investment, with eighteen months mini-
mum before payback. Third, access to formal credit did not make
research participants less dependent on illicit crops. In any case,
peasants’ access to credit is not unavoidably conditioned on them
having a formal land title. Fourth, prior attempts to shift to licit
livelihoods typically failed due to poor harvests, because people
could not find buyers for their legal produce or because earnings
from sales barely covered the costs of production/transportation.
As explained below, all of these findings have implications for com-
mon claims about the relationship between tenure (in)formality
and illicit crop cultivation.
We recognize that our analysis is limited to coca production
(which is different to opium-poppy and marijuana) in a single
municipality, and that our findings cannot necessarily be extrapo-
lated to other places. Nevertheless, the evidence we provide chal-
lenges generalizations and assumptions common in drug policy
discourses, revealing - at the very least - the problem with de-
contextualized designs and interventions. Furthermore, as detailed
in later sections, previous research from other parts of the world
bolsters some of the broader propositions (e.g., land formalization
does not necessarily increase credit access/uptake) that form our
argument. Thus, our conclusions build upon wider rural develop-
ment scholarship, which drug policy specialists have apparently
overlooked.
The subsequent section examines the rationales for incorporat-
ing land formalization into counternarcotics policy, providing an
overview of the scant literature on the topic. We then introduce
our case study context and methods (section 3), before using our
findings to explore three basic issues at the heart of the discussion
on property rights and illicit crop cultivation: tenure security (sec-
tion 4), investment (dis)incentives (section 5), and credit access/
uptake (section 6). In the final discussion (section 7), we argue that
land formalization - on its own or even combined with superficial
substitution projects - is not likely to reduce dependence on coca
cultivation in Puerto Asís, but is imperative for other reasons.2. Land formalization and counternarcotics policy: an overview
of the literature
Land formalization has been promoted both as a standalone
counternarcotics strategy,1 and as a complement to punitive mea-
sures and Alternative Development initiatives. Overall, the drug pol-
icy literature refers to at least six rationales (some independent and
some tied to other tactics) for incorporating land formalization into
counternarcotics policy. A single policy or program may be based on1 For example, an evaluation of the Forest Ranger Families initiative in Colombia
concluded: ‘‘land titling could prove more effective than Alternative Development
programs themselves, since people are less likely to cultivate illicit [crops] on their
own land” (2012 study cited in Garzón & Riveros, 2018, p. 14). And though - in theory
- Colombia’s Formalize to Substitute program is linked with Alternative Development
(AD) projects, in practice there has been little or no coordination between the two
(Garzón & Riveros, 2018, p. 15; see also Peña et al, 2019, 97).
2
more than one of the rationales outlined in the paragraphs that
follow.
First, in some contexts, access to a formal land title has been
made conditional on eradication of illicit crops (on Peru, see
Kernaghan, 2017, p. 656; on Colombia, see Garzón & Riveros,
2018, p. 15; Peña et al, 2019, pp. 96–97). Thus, a simple rationale
for incorporating land formalization into drug policy is that the
state’s control over peoples’ access to statutory property rights
can be used to incentivize eradication through reward and punish-
ment (see also Garzón & Riveros, 2018, p. 17). We have not encoun-
tered any texts that explicitly evaluate or recommend conditional
titling as a counternarcotics strategy in and of itself.
Second, some countries’ (e.g., Peru and Colombia) laws allow for
confiscation - via asset forfeiture proceedings - of land used for the
cultivation of illicit crops (Mason & Campany, 1995, pp. 143, 145;
Peña et al, 2019). A number of observers suggest that the threat of
confiscation deters the (re-)planting of illicit crops, in particular if
the farmer has been granted a formal title, because this means she/
he has more to lose (Garzón & Riveros, 2018, p. 13; Muñoz-Mora
et al., 2018; Samper-Strouss 2019, cited in Peña et al, 2019, 98).
The underlying idea is that titling serves drug control because it
makes the threat of confiscation more powerful. We have not come
across any texts that evaluate the effectiveness of such confiscatory
policies, nor any that directly and openly defend them (see Muñoz-
Mora et al., 2018), presumably because of the socially regressive
implications, given that those who cultivate illicit crops are typi-
cally marginalized smallholders (for a critique of this policy, see
Peña et al, 2019).
Third, land formalization (including updating registries and
cadasters), if done well, can facilitate access to information rele-
vant for improving the design and implementation of illicit crop
substitution or Alternative Development programs. It may also
serve monitoring or surveillance, and thus law enforcement pur-
poses, as in the case of Bolivia – discussed below (Grimmelmann
et al., 2017, p. 103).
Fourth, programs and projects run by governments or NGOs
may disbar applicants without formal land titles. In this sense, for-
malization efforts could improve access to different forms of assis-
tance (including subsidies and support that have nothing to do
with drug control), which in turn could help farmers establish licit
ventures (Garzón & Riveros, 2018, p. 17; Ojeda, 2011, p. 6; Colom-
bian policymaker, cited in Peña et al, 2019, 108; UNODC, 2015,
p.107).
Fifth, some argue that having a formal property title encourages
people to stay put, for example by increasing feelings of responsi-
bility and attachment to place. This is relevant to counternarcotics
aims given that people often respond to forced eradication by
migrating and replanting elsewhere, and that coca and opium-
poppy growers are thought to be particularly footloose (Garzón &
Riveros, 2018, pp. 13, 14; UNODC, 2016; UNODC, 2015, pp. 79,
100, 106-107, 110).2
Sixth and finally, the most popular rationale for linking land for-
malization to drug control is that the former is said to encourage
and enable investments in licit agricultural ventures. More specif-
ically, ensuring farmers have formal property titles for their lands
is said to (a) increase tenure security, thereby (b) improving incen-
tives for long-term investments, and to (c) facilitate access to
investment credit (see e.g., Grimmelmann et al., 2017; UNODC,
2015, pp. 105-107; Garzón & Riveros, 2018; Muñoz-Mora et al.,
2018). This rationale builds on a more general argument about2 Ramírez’s book (2011) provides a forceful critique of this ‘‘distorted representa-
tion [of Putumayo’s coca farmers] as rootless migrants looking for a fortune in easy
money in order to return to their regions of origin” (p. 122). It also offers important
insights into how such assumptions have shaped government discourse and practice
in Colombia.
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(e.g., Feder & Feeney, 1991; Besley, 1995; Soto, 2001; Deininger,
2003; for a critical overview of this argument, see Sjaastad &
Cousins, 2009; Bromley, 2009; Lawson-Remer, 2014; for Colombia,
see Acero & Parada, 2019). Since this rationale is the focus of the
article, we provide further details about the underlying assump-
tions and claims.
(a) The investment rationale is partially reliant on the assump-
tion that tenure informality translates into tenure insecurity and
that vulnerability to land loss is reduced when people have formal
property titles. (b) It logically follows that people without titles
avoid making large long-term investments for fear of losing time
and money due to dispossession and, conversely, that clearly
defined formal property rights incentivize investment. Thus,
tenure informality is thought to be one reason coca and opium-
poppy cultivators don’t shift to licit crops with large investment
outlays and timeframes (Mejía, 2015, p. 13; Grimmelmann et al.,
2017, pp. 77, 88, 100; Muñoz-Mora et al., 2018, p. 270;
Anderson, 2018, pp. 7, 15). The other side of this argument is that
opium-poppy and coca are particularly suitable crops for farmers
without formal land rights because the investments required to
establish them are comparatively small, and because they do not
take long to produce (Holmes et al., 2018, pp. 123, 129;
Grimmelmann et al., 2017, pp. 88, 98; Anderson, 2018, p. 7). (c)
Finally, the credit component of the investment rationale assumes
that an additional reason poppy and coca growers don’t shift to
legal economies is because they lack capital to invest and that land
formalization will facilitate access to investment capital through
previously unobtainable loans (see Grimmelmann et al., 2017,
p. 103; Garzón & Riveros, 2018, pp. 14, 17; UNODC, 2015, 2016).
Despite growing interest in land formalization as a counternar-
cotics tool, few have scrutinized the various rationales used to
advocate for such policies/programs and there is very little
research on the relationship between tenure (in)formality and illi-
cit crop cultivation (UNODC, 2015, p. 105; Garzón & Riveros, 2018,
pp. 13–14). Nonetheless, the literature suggests that counternar-
cotics success stories involved land titling and registration.
Thailand’s illicit drug policies are widely considered to be
exemplary and, according to Anderson, the formalization of land
rights was central to their success. Formal ownership, he claims,
improved tenure security and thus stimulated investment in alter-
native long-term crops like coffee (2018, p. 7; 2017, p. 54). Unfor-
tunately, he does not elucidate the basis for this claim. In any case,
Anderson does not attribute the marked decline of opium-poppy
cultivation in Thailand to a single factor. Notably, the Thai govern-
ment also invested heavily in roads, and guaranteed purchase of
the farmers’ legal substitute produce at minimum (often subsi-
dized) prices (Anderson, 2018, pp. 6–7, 15; 2017, pp. 53–54).
Grimmelmann et al. (2017), whose publication (unlike Ander-
son’s) is specifically about the land-drugs nexus, describe an Alter-
native Development program implemented in the San Martín
regionof Peru,which included formalizing the vastmajority of farm-
ers’ land rights. According to the authors, in the wake of this pro-
gram, economic and social wellbeing in the region improved,
while coca cultivation fell. They suggest this was partially a result
of ‘‘the land registration [component of the] programme [which] is
acknowledged to be one of the main incentives for smallholder
farmers to switch to alternative crops” (Grimmelmann et al., 2017,
p. 99). However, they do not explain how or why this worked.
These same authors highlight the role of land formalization in
Bolivia’s coca control program. Titling and registration (combined
with a coca producer enrollment and associated database) facili-
tated the social-control component of the program by making it
easier to determine ownership of a particular coca plot and thus
verify compliance with the cultivation ceiling (Grimmelmann3
et al., 2017, pp. 100–102; see also Mortensen & Gutierrez, 2019,
p. 68; Grisaffi & Ledebur, 2016, p. 11).
The final publication considered in this review, by Muñoz-Mora
et al. (2018), is the first to concentrate exclusively on the question
of whether and how tenure (in)formality affects illicit crop cultiva-
tion. Their quantitative analyses of 192 municipalities in Colombia
(from 2000 to 2009) indicate that ‘‘a one-standard-deviation
increase in the formality index for small landowners is associated
with a decrease in the share of municipal area allocated to coca
crops of 0.101 percentage points” (p. 269). According to the
authors, this means that on average, ‘‘the formalization of one
additional hectare of land [. . .] is associated with a decrease of
approximately 1.4 ha of land allocated to coca” (p. 269).
Nevertheless, the authors do not explain clearly what accounts
for the decline they observed in the land area used for coca: land
formalization or land formalization combined with forced eradica-
tion and Alternative Development (AD) programs. In some places,
they present land formalization as an alternative to forced eradica-
tion (Muñoz-Mora et al., 2018, p. 282), yet in others they present
formalization as a complement to conventional counternarcotics
policies. For example: ‘‘attempts to reduce coca crops with the
implementation of Plan Colombia [which included forced eradica-
tion and AD programs] were more effective in those municipalities
with more formalized land property rights” (ibid). In sum, they
leave the reader with unanswered questions regarding their find-
ings and the arguments they derive from these.
Muñoz-Mora et al. (2018) provide two potential explanations
for the observed relationship between land formalization (plus
Plan Colombia?) and coca cultivation. One is that formal titlehold-
ers ‘‘have more to lose” than their counterparts without state-
recognized property rights and hence are more likely to give up
coca to avoid punitive land confiscation (Muñoz-Mora et al.,
2018, pp. 269, 274). They call this the ‘‘deterrence mechanism”.
The authors’ second explanation is that the War on Drugs
improved the ‘‘institutional environment” and the ‘‘rule of law”
(concepts they do not define) and that smallholders with legal land
titles benefitted more because they could ‘‘use the land more in
this setting, become more visible, and take better advantage of
alternative programs” (Muñoz-Mora et al., 2018, p. 268). They also
affirm that formalization comes with ‘‘positive externalities” such
as ‘‘higher productivity, investment, social capital” and access to
credit (ibid, pp. 269, 273–274). They call this ‘‘the substitution
mechanism”, which is confusing given that in this context substi-
tution - the replacement of coca with licit crops - is an outcome
rather than a mechanism.
Muñoz-Mora et al. (2018) do not offer convincing evidence for
either of these posited casual mechanisms. While there is no
attempt to ‘‘test” the ‘‘deterrence mechanism” at all, they do claim
to ‘‘test” the ‘‘substitution mechanism” by analyzing the relation-
ship between land formalization and the planting of new coffee
crops (often a substitute for coca) within a given municipality (ibid,
pp. 278, 281). The test was fruitful in the sense that they did find a
positive association. Nevertheless, it is unclear why this should be
treated as evidence for the poorly defined ‘‘substitution mecha-
nism”. The link between coffee planting and formalization could
also be an outcome of the ‘‘deterrence mechanism”: fearing
confiscation of their newly titled lands, farmers replace their coca
with coffee. More plausibly, the link has nothing to do with coca. In
general, Muñoz-Mora et al. (2018) do not provide empirical
analyses to support their claim that ‘‘improved land rights create
micro-economic incentives to change risk-taking behavior”
(2018, p. 274).
In conclusion, the drugs literature refers to at least six rationales
for incorporating land formalization into counternarcotics policy
but supporting evidence is weak. We contribute to filling this
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area of Colombia, focused specifically on the causal mechanisms
that underlie the investment rationale. As explained below, we
did not find evidence to support this rationale. Thus, our case study
challenges the generalizability of key causal mechanisms that the
literature suggests account for the alleged relationship between
tenure (in)formality and drug crop cultivation. We see our contri-
bution as another brick in an edifice of theory and evidence that
must be constructed collectively. To what extent, under what con-
ditions, and how or through which mechanisms land titling and
registration can contribute to drug-control policy are still open
questions – a fact ignored by policy makers who treat land formal-
ization as a magic bullet.3. A case study of Puerto Asís
3.1. Case study context and relevance
Puerto Asís is located in the department (akin to a state or pro-
vince) of Putumayo, in an area of the Amazon basin shared
between Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (see Fig. 1; see Table 1 for
basic demographic and further geographical information). The
Amazonian lowlands of Putumayo are relatively isolated from the
rest of Colombia, far from Bogotá and the more populous central
Andean region. It was only in the second half of the 20th century
that Putumayo started to be recognized as a political/administra-
tive entity, distinct from the rest of the Amazon territory, following
increased settlement in the region.
The colonization of lower Putumayo was driven by lack of
access to land in nearby departments (Nariño, Cauca and Huila),
high levels of civil war violence elsewhere in the country
(especially in the 1940s and 1950s), and various economic booms,
centered on: quina bark (late 1800s), rubber (early 1900s), timber
and rare animal skins (circa 1950s-1960s), oil (1960s-1970s), and
coca (1980s-1990s). Oil and coca were particularly important ‘pull
factors’ and remain the dominant economic sectors of Puerto AsísFig. 1. Map showing the location of Puerto Asís, Putumayo.
Table 1
Puerto Asís: basic geographic and demographic information.
Population
Area
Municipal public services - per cent of homes connected
Distance from Puerto Asís town to Mocoa, the department’s capital
Weather
Sources: Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), 2020; Ministerio del Trabajo & P
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and other lowland municipalities of Putumayo to date (Ramírez,
2011; CNMH, 2015).
It is important to note that, despite increased settlement in the
municipality, infrastructure and public services in Puerto Asís are
still deficient and in some rural areas non-existent. This is one
among several contextual factors that has hindered coca substitu-
tion. It also affects land prices in the municipality, which remain
relatively low – a fact that most certainly influences the tenure
dynamics discussed in subsequent sections.
Puerto Asís is a good example of a ‘‘classical” coca growing ter-
ritory (see Gootenberg & Dávalos, 2018) for several reasons. First,
as noted above, it is an area of recent colonization where settlers
arrived to expand the agricultural frontier – as also happened in
the Chapare region of Bolivia and the Upper Huallaga Valley of
Peru. Second, commercial coca cultivation emerged relatively early
in Puerto Asís (compared to other parts of Colombia) and coca has
remained the most important cash crop in the municipality since
the 1980s, providing a livelihood for farmers on the margins of
mainstream development processes. Third, for more than forty
years, guerrilla groups (especially the former FARC-EP) held con-
siderable influence over the area, disputing the sovereignty and
legitimacy of the Colombian state. More generally, the illicit drug
economy in Puerto Asís interlinks with violence wrought by state
forces, drug trafficking organizations, anti-subversive paramili-
taries, and left-wing guerrillas. Finally, because of its centrality in
the coca economy and the armed conflict, Puerto Asís has also been
at the center of counterinsurgency and counternarcotics policies,
including the infamous Plan Colombia, which combined milita-
rized anti-drug strategies with Alternative Development programs
(see CNMH, 2015; Tate, 2015; Ramírez, 2011, 2010). Thus, in the
world of illicit drug production, Puerto Asís may be considered
what Mahoney & Goertz call a ‘‘substantively important case” with
‘‘special normative interest” (2012, p. 185).
3.2. Case study approach and methods
The research underpinning this article was part of a four-year
multi-institutional project entitled ‘‘Drugs & (dis)order: building
sustainable peacetime economies in the aftermath of war”. The pro-
ject pursued various strands of inquiry inAfghanistan, Colombia and
Myanmar, with the broad aim of better understanding the links
between illicit drug economies, development and conflict/peace-
building in these countries’ borderlands. The Universidad Nacional
/ Colombia country team, of which we were part, focused on four
borderlands: Puerto Asís, Tumaco, Catatumbo and the SierraNevada
of Santa Marta. The purpose of this case selection was to cover var-
ious sea and land borders and different coca histories: the emer-
gence of illicit drug crop production before, with or after the
arrival of non-state armed groups and in early and late phases of
Colombia’s cocaine production trajectory.While the first three areas
remain important drug-production hotspots, the Sierra Nevada
experienced earlymarijuana and coca booms, but currently has very
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F. Thomson, M. Parada-Hernández and C. Acero World Development 149 (2022) 105680Given the difficulty of building deep contextual knowledge (in
terms of time, but also access, especially in conflict-affected zones),
most project field researchers focused on just one or two of the
four areas listed above. We - the three authors of this article - were
part of the Puerto Asís sub-team. Between us, we have visited the
municipality fourteen times, for the work carried out within the
Drugs & (dis)order project (2018–2020), as well as for previous
research (2015). During these visits, we conducted more than
100 individual and group interviews, observed dozens of meetings,
engaged in countless informal conversations, and learned through
simple but vital experiences such as walking around villages and
farms with the people we interviewed (we visited at least 18 dif-
ferent rural subdistricts or veredas). Our contextual knowledge of
Puerto Asís has clear advantages in terms of ‘‘within-case analysis”
(see e.g., Mahoney & Goertz, 2012, pp. 184-185), specifically aimed
at understanding the real-life dynamics of land tenure, the coca
economy and the relationship between the two.
All three of us had prior interests in the political economy of
land and we tended to ask related questions during our dialogues
with coca producers. This raised further questions, as their stories
and views about land tenure often did not conform to mainstream
narratives, nor to some of our own expectations. Eventually, we
decided to pursue these issues more systematically.
We started by conducting a literature review on ‘the land-drugs
nexus’ or, more accurately, nexuses. This literature review helped
us devise what we call the ‘land questionnaire’ (LQ, see supplement
1) - a guide for conducting semi-structured interviews. Thus, we
used a ‘‘theory-first approach” (Yin, 2003, p. 32); we developed
various questions on the basis of existing propositions. Those ques-
tions relevant to this article were aimed at examining some of the
key causal mechanisms that are said to account for the posited
relationship between tenure (in)formality and illicit drug crop cul-
tivation, namely:
- Land formalization reduces illicit drug crop production by
increasing access to credit, which enables investment in alter-
native licit livelihoods.
- Tenure informality contributes to the perpetuation of illicit
drug crop economies because it prevents people from accessing
credit and lack of investment capital is one of the main reasons
people don’t invest in licit livelihoods.
- Land formalization reduces coca production by improving per-
ceptions of tenure security, which in turn encourages invest-
ment in long-term licit livelihoods.
- Tenure informality contributes to the perpetuation of illicit
drug crop economies because it implies tenure insecurity,
which in turn discourages long-term high-cost investments in
licit projects and favors continued dependence on illicit crops,
which are said to be short-term and have small investment
outlays.
Qualitative case study research is uniquely well suited to study-
ing causal mechanisms since it entails explaining within context
(Bennett & Elman, 2006; Mahoney & Goertz, 2012; Sayer, 2010).
We have labelled Puerto Asís a ‘case’ because we believe there is
sufficient similarity of context (shaping causal processes) within
the municipality to consider it a ‘case’. Nevertheless, our ‘case’
study is made up of households/individuals from different subdis-
tricts, who could be considered ‘cases’ in their own right. In brief,
our ‘‘within-case-analysis” covers more than a dozen individual
cases, as well as broader or more contextual ‘‘causal process-
observations” (see Mahoney & Goertz, 2012, pp. 10-11, 90; see also
Bennett & Elman, 2006).
We identified participants through purposive rather than prob-
ability sampling. In the earlier stages of our research, we contacted
local Community Action Board or JAC leaderswhowe found via offi-5
cial public listings. These community organizers have a privileged
knowledge of local socio-economic dynamics. Therefore, we con-
sidered it appropriate to turn to them as a first source of informa-
tion. We then used a snowball strategy to reach other
interviewees, including farmers who did not have leadership roles.
We deliberately sought to interview farmers from different rural
sub-districts with the aim of identifying contextual issues at the
local level or sub-municipal spatial variation. For the LQ interviews,
specifically, we contacted social leaders and farmers who we met
during previous fieldwork trips and – to a lesser extent - their
friends/neighbors.We knew these interviewswouldwork bestwith
acquaintances, given the length and detail of the questionnaire and
some people’s reluctance to speak openly about illicit activities.
Our original intention was to conduct 30–40 semi-structured
(LQ) interviews centered specifically on land and coca. However,
due to the pandemic, we were only able to do 15 LQ interviews.
As an imperfect solution, we selected a further 20 interview tran-
scripts from our archive that answer at least some questions posed
in our land questionnaire. Taken together, these 35 interviews
involved at least 50 interviewees, the vast majority of who were
coca growers (cocaleros) at the time or had been in the past. In addi-
tion to including a mixture of current and former cocaleros, we also
sought to include both farmers with and without formal land titles,
and interviewees from various sub-districts. At least 23 of the inter-
viewees were also community organizers (JAC president, vice-
president or secretary) or social leaders more broadly (e.g., mem-
bers of regional movements and organizations). In the case of JAC
leaders, it is part of their job to be aware of which JAC affiliates lack
a land title, who owes contributions to community infrastructure,
or boundary disputes between neighbors – to name just a few
examples. In this sense, interviewing one JAC president might give
you more insight than interviewing four farmers who have never
had such a leadership role. Finally, we included an additional 10
interviews with government functionaries, for a total of 45 inter-
views. Among other things, these interviews helped us to cross-
check the information that farmers shared with us. We provide a
table with basic information about interviews/interviewees in
Appendix 1; an Excel file (supplement 2) contains further details.
We used open coding to search for basic patterns but also any
anomalies in terms of farmers’ views and stories pertaining to
specific topics, like credit and investment. We also used different
triangulation techniques to ensure the reliability and validity of
our findings. First, we critically evaluated each other’s empirical
analyses and claims (‘‘investigator triangulation”, Rothbauer,
2012). Second, we asked the interviewees additional questions to
ensure we understood their responses properly and to iron out
any apparent contradictions. We also found interviewing couples
or small groups of neighbors to be advantageous because the inter-
viewees sometimes corrected one-another or discussed things
amongst themselves (‘‘within method triangulation”, Denzin,
1978). Third, we were careful to ensure that farmer interviewees
were from various rural sub-districts and would often ask different
people about the same things. Fourth and finally, we triangulated
some key information with survey results, fieldwork observations,
government documents, written consultations with specialists and
secondary sources.4. Tenure (in)formality and (in)security in context
In order to explore the relationship between illicit crop cultiva-
tion and tenure (in)formality, it is necessary to first understand
what the latter actually means in the Colombian context and
how it manifests in the cocalero world specifically. In Puerto Asís,
campesinos’ views and understandings of tenure (in)formality are
heterogenous, occasionally ambiguous, and do not always coincide
5 Arguably, this use of notarized purchase/sales agreements actually represents a
significant cultural and historical shift towards more ‘formal’ land transactions,
though they are not technically formal in the eyes of the state. According to our
interviewees, oral agreements used to be more common because there was more
‘‘trust” or ‘‘respect” and people’s ‘‘word still had value”; in some cases, oral
agreements are still used, especially when the transaction is between neighbors or
acquaintances (LQ1, LQ2, LQ3, LQ4, LQ6, LQ7, LQ15). In this sense, the mere act of
putting an agreement into writing is itself seen as comparatively formal; getting the
F. Thomson, M. Parada-Hernández and C. Acero World Development 149 (2022) 105680with those held by researchers or officials. Furthermore, govern-
ment entities and functionaries themselves often bestow informal
or semiformal documents and procedures with validity, directly
and indirectly, reinforcing the ambiguity of property rules. Finally,
tenure informality - as conventionally defined - does not necessar-
ily imply insecurity (as is well-established in the rural develop-
ment literature; see, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 2006; Trebilcock & Veel,
2008; Goldstein & Udry, 2008; Deininger, & Feder, 2009; Ho,
2014). Many peasants in Puerto Asís express confidence in local
institutions, which provide some protection (albeit imperfect) of
their land rights. As shown in subsequent sections, these findings
have implications for the arguments and assumptions that under-
lie the use of land formalization as a counternarcotics strategy.
4.1. The dynamics of tenure (in)formality in Puerto Asís
Under Colombian law, only three types of documents confer full
and formal property rights over land: public deeds, adjudication
resolutions and - in certain instances - judicial sentences. These
documents must be registered with the Office of Public Instru-
ments to be considered official proof of ownership. Most peasants
in Colombia do not hold such registered documents. According to
government estimates, 54.31% of farms in the country are not cov-
ered by up-to-date formal titles; in Puerto Asís, the figure is even
higher, reaching 87% (UPRA, n.d). A detailed examination of the
multiple reasons for these high levels of informality is beyond
the scope of this paper. We discuss just four factors (which often
overlap and combine), with the broader aim of showing how land
tenure works in practice in Puerto Asís.
First, the relative efficacy of informal and semi-formal land
tenure systems may reduce the real and perceived need for official
property documents. As explained below, certificates of possession
and purchase/sales agreements (cartas compraventa) are often used
in lieu of formal titles, while Community Action Boards and local
inspectors (inspectores de policía) provide inhabitants with a degree
of tenure security regardless of whether the central state recog-
nizes them as legal owners of their farms.
Second, significant areas of land in Puerto Asís remain untitled
and thus are legally classified as baldíos or public lands. Notably,
the state itself does not have reliable data on this (DNP & Misión
Rural, 2014). Technically, the only way to acquire statutory rights
over these public lands is to request an adjudication resolution
from the National Land Agency (formerly INCODER and before that
INCORA); by law, judges are not supposed to pass sentences that
recognize property rights through prescription, nor can notaries
draw up public deeds for such lands. Many peasants are interested
in formalizing their land ownership and hence do apply for titles.3
But they sometimes have to wait years for a reply (LQ2, LQ3, LQ4,
LQ6; see also Peña & Zuleta, 2018) and/or their request may be
rejected (LQ5, I7*, I18).4 In such cases, purchase/sales agreements
are the second-best and only option, whether in the interim or
long-term.
A third factor behind informality is the cost and difficulty of for-
mal land transactions (LQ15, LQ14). Both buyer and seller might
prefer oral agreements or to notarize written purchase/sales agree-
ments, a simpler and cheaper process. In this way, plots once for-
malized through titling are brought back into the informal realm
through off-the-record transactions. Once this has happened, it is3 The tables in appendices 2 and 3 provide partial answers to the question of why
some campesinos apply for titles while others do not. It is also worth mentioning that
most interviewees who applied took advantage of a titling process organized by
government entities or local community leaders (LQ1, LQ2, LQ3, LQ7, LQ14, LQ12,
LQ13, I5, I6, I7). In other words, they responded to an opportunity and did not have to
muster the determination to confront government bureaucracy on their own.
4 We use the * to indicate when an interviewee is referring to a generality or to
something that happened to a friend or neighbor, rather than their own experience.
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very difficult for a subsequent buyer to acquire a deed; this could
involve, for example, tracking down the original titleholder (who
may be deceased) and a legal procedure to ‘clean’ the ownership
of the plot (LQ1*, LQ10, LQ11).
Fourth and finally, some peasants are unaware of legal property
rules, misunderstand them, or hold different views about how they
work based on experience rather than written laws. For example,
one woman said that most people in her community have ‘‘formal
titles” because they purchased lots (through purchase/sales agree-
ments) that had been broken off from a larger farmwith an original
adjudication resolution (I8). Poor communication of the law and/or
lack of access to information is part of the problem. But the para-
graphs that follow show how some apparent misunderstandings
are actually grounded in the real-world functioning of Colombia’s
complex and contradictory property system.
As noted already, campesinos in Puerto Asís often acquire land
through written purchase/sales agreements (LQ1, LQ11, LQ12, I5,
I10, I17), which many also get authenticated by a notary for an
additional sense of formality (LQ2, LQ3, LQ4, LQ5, LQ6, LQ13,
LQ14).5 People typically see this as a procedure with legal force that
allows them to act as legitimate owners of the land. For example: ‘‘[I
went to the Notary Office] to secure the land [. . .] because an authen-
ticated purchase/sale agreement is almost like a deed; one could
even say that it is a deed because it has a lot of validity” (LQ4).
Another man, from a different area of the municipality, insisted that
notarized purchase/sales agreements confer legal property rights
(I19).
These are perfectly reasonable views since, in practice, govern-
ment entities themselves bestow purchase/sales agreements with
value. For example, the state-owned Agrarian Bank has accepted
these agreements as evidence of land tenure (more on this in sec-
tion 6), as have the institutions in charge of titling (Agencia
Nacional de Tierras, 2018b, p.1), and the recent National Crop Sub-
stitution Program – PNIS (DAPRE, 2019). These agreements may
even be used to defend a land claim in court.6 Thus, it is unsurpris-
ing that peasants give formal and solemn value to documents that do
not technically bestow full property rights under Colombian law.
Such de-facto or practical understandings of land ownership are
widespread. In a survey of PNIS participants, conducted in Puerto
Asís in 2019, 83% of farmers (101 of 121 surveyed) self-identified
as ‘‘property owners”. Nevertheless, just 53 of those 101 (44%) said
that their name appears on the ‘certificate of freedom and tradi-
tion’ for their farm (Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de
Derechos de Propiedad Agraria, 2019) – an essential criterion of
tenure formality in Colombia, from an official perspective.7 Surveys
applied in other parts of Colombia (Garzón & Riveros, 2018, p. 8)
show this phenomenon is not peculiar to Puerto Asís.
The preceding paragraphs indicate that state officials and cam-
pesinos often have divergent notions of property rights.agreement authenticated by a notary is one step further in this shift towards
formality.
6 The Colombian Supreme Court has recognized that contracts or purchase
agreements are ‘‘fair titles” that serve to prove possession or occupation of the land
but do not confer full property rights. See, for example: Supreme Court of Justice, Civil
Cassation Chamber, Case No. SS-4128931030022000-00050-01, 14 April 2009, Judge
Jaime Arrubla.
7 This certificate is issued by the Office of Public Instruments and contains legal
information about the property, such as the name(s) of the owner(s) and details of
any land-use agreements or mortgages that affect the asset.
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only public deeds or adjudication resolutions provide full guaran-
tees of ownership (LQ1, LQ2, LQ9, LQ14). This shows that views
of land ownership and tenure formality are heterogenous and
ambiguous in rural Colombia. Some believe that purchase/sales
agreements are equivalent to formal titles; many know they are
not but use them anyway because in practice they serve similar
purposes; others seek a public deed or adjudication resolution pre-
cisely because they view other documents as inferior.9 Before the demobilization of the FARC-EP in 2017, inhabitants sometimes called
upon this rebel group to intervene in land conflicts (conduct an investigation and
enforce a solution), in particular when the interested parties refused to accept the
mediation or decision of the JAC (LQ2, LQ5, LQ7, LQ12, LQ14, I7).
104.2. Tenure security on the ground
As implied above, campesinos make do in a context character-
ized by - what is conventionally defined as - high levels of tenure
informality. They buy, sell, rent, exploit and invest in farms that do
not have state-recognized titles. This indicates that informal/semi-
formal land tenure institutions generate a minimum level of trust.
In Puerto Asís, Community Action Boards or JACs (Juntas de Acción
Comunal) are fundamental to local tenure security (though it is
important to note that the ability of the JACs to provide tenure
security varies). 8Even those who have official property documents
typically rely on the JACs.
JACs are social and civic non-profit organizations, formed by the
inhabitants of a rural subdistrict or urban neighborhood, who join
efforts and resources to solve the problems of their community.
They were first institutionalized in 1958 and are now recognized
in Colombian law as the basic cell of ‘‘participatory democracy”
(Law 743 of 2002) through which organized citizens may design
and implement local development plans (for a more detailed his-
tory of the JACs, see Gutiérrez, 2007, p. 85). In some rural areas,
they also have a de facto role in land tenure relations.
Many JACs - unlike the municipal authorities - keep records of
land tenure/residency within their respective rural subdistricts
(LQ1, LQ2, LQ5, I17, F8). This enables them to certify inhabitants’
land rights through ‘certificates of possession’ (certificados de sana
posesión) which can be used, for example, to access agricultural
and financial services. Legally, theMayor’s Office is the entity autho-
rized to issue these certificates, but in practicemunicipal authorities
rely on the knowledge and intervention (e.g., signatures or letters) of
the Boards. The fact that people often approach their Board directly
to obtain this certificate is telling (LQ1, LQ5, LQ7, LQ15).
This close-up knowledge of local land tenure also makes the
JACs the primary mediators in related disputes. Indeed, most
Boards have a ‘committee of cohabitation and conciliation’ to
resolve local conflicts. Consider the following anecdote: a widow
whose husband had purchased land (via an oral agreement) from
a man who subsequently died was under threat of being evicted
by the seller’s heirs who claimed rights over the farm. The Board
intervened and got the heirs to recognize the widow’s rights over
part of the land (15 of 60 ha) on the basis that she had lived there
for more than 10 years (LQ1*, LQ8). More commonly, disputes are
over property boundaries (LQ1, LQ2, LQ3, LQ15). In these cases, too,
the Board becomes a ‘‘mediator”, ensuring ‘‘respectful dialogue”
between the parties (I17). Sometimes, the Board calls on ‘‘older”
inhabitants or village ‘‘founders” to testify, as they are presumed
to know the history of the community and tenure relations (I17,
LQ7).
JACs are not legally recognized as having conflict resolution
powers. Nevertheless, many rural inhabitants turn to them to8 Some JACs are better organized than others. For example, one interviewee told us
that inhabitants no longer inform the JAC about their land transactions, which makes
it difficult for the Board to arbitrate when a conflict arises (LQ7). It is also important to
note that the JACs offer protection to their affiliates (those who make regular
contributions and participate in collective labor events) but in some rural subdistricts
not everyone is affiliated (LQ1, LQ2, LQ5).
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resolve local land disputes, and decisions made by the Board are
generally respected by the community (LQ1, LQ2, LQ3, LQ5,
LQ15). On occasions when the JAC is unable to resolve a problem,
people turn to municipal authorities, such as the local inspectors
(LQ5, LQ3, LQ15).9 Even in these cases, Boards and community lead-
ers (in particular, the JAC presidents) usually still play a vital role,
since government functionaries rely on their knowledge of the com-
munity and tenure history/relations (F8, LQ7).
In sum, Community Action Boards often keep records of owner-
ship; issue or back certificates of possession that are accepted by
third parties; are regularly called upon to resolve local land dis-
putes; and provide information to municipal authorities. In this
way, the JACs usually provide some degree of land tenure security
to their affiliates, including those who do not have formal state-
recognized titles (LQ1, LQ2, LQ5, LQ11).10 We have placed emphasis
on the qualifiers ‘usually’ and ‘to some degree’ because the capacity
of the JACs may vary across space and time, and even strong JACs
may be unable to counteract certain forms of tenure insecurity, espe-
cially those associated with powerful actors like oil companies,
armed groups and the state itself, as explained in the final section
(7) below.5. Land tenure (in)formality, investment and (il)licit crop
cultivation
In this section, we explore the links between tenure (in)formal-
ity, landholder investment, and (il)licit crop cultivation in Puerto
Asís. We focus specifically on the idea that farmers without formal
titles tend to refrain from making large long-term investments and
that this, in turn, contributes to the perpetuation of coca cultiva-
tion, which is deemed a particularly convenient crop for farmers
with (allegedly) insecure land holdings. The paragraphs that follow
show this argument to be problematic on a number of levels.
5.1. Investment incentives and perceptions of tenure (in)formality and
(in)security
The first thing to recognize is that the posited relationship
between (in)formal tenure and investment depends on perceptions.
According to the line of reasoning described earlier, people invest
more when they have a formal property title for their land because
they perceive it to be safer to do so and vice versa: they may not
invest if they do not have such documents because they feel inse-
cure. However, as explained above, the relationship between
tenure (in)formality and (in)security - both objective and subjec-
tive - is not as linear and simple as is often supposed. This claim,
which is well-supported by the rural development literature more
broadly (e.g., Fitzpatrick, 2006; Trebilcock & Veel, 2008; Goldstein
& Udry, 2008; Deininger, & Feder, 2009; Ho, 2014), clearly has
implications for the popular idea that formalizing land ownership
improves investment incentives.
Let us consider the most extreme example first. Recall that some
peasants believe (for good reasons) that notarized purchase/sales
agreements confer full and formal land rights, though technicallyThe informal/semi-formal tenure institutions examined in this section reveal the
limitations of the customary versus statutory tenure binary. These institutions are
neither technically part of the statutory system, as explained in the main text above,
nor ‘traditional’ and ‘customary’ in the strict sense. They were built relatively
recently, starting around the 1950s, by mestizo peasant settlers, through their
interactions with one another and with local government authorities, as well as rebel
groups. This is something worth exploring further in future research. (Thank you to
Patrick Meehan for pointing this out to us.)
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property rights has deterred this group from making large long-
term investments in their land, since they do not consider them-
selves to lack these rights in the first place. Conversely, participation
in a formalization program is not likely to significantly change this
group’s perception of their own tenure security and thereby inspire
them to invest more. The survey results provided in the preceding
section suggest this group may be significant in number. However,
let us suppose thatmany of thosewhodescribed themselves as ‘pro-
prietors’ or ‘owners’ are aware that they lack formal titles in the eyes
of the state. Even so, because tenure informality - as conventionally
defined - does not necessarily imply that people perceive their
tenure to be insecure, the idea that coca farmers are discouraged
from investing in long-term licit crops due to a lack of official land
titles remains a problematic generalization.
We are not arguing that tenure (in)formality never affects
investment incentives, much less that it doesn’t matter. Indeed,
one interviewee - a community leader whose work includes advo-
cating for land formalization - stated that her family may not have
devoted as much work and money to their farm had they been
unable to secure a title because ‘‘there is always that fear that
someone else could take it” (LQ1). In another case, a woman who
invested in planting 5,000 cedar trees is - according to the farm
administrator - extremely concerned that she could lose every-
thing at any moment because she lacks a formal title (LQ10). As
demonstrated by previous research, the relationship between for-
malized property rights and investment is heterogenous (for a sys-
tematic review of various studies see Lawry et al., 2017). The
evidence indicates that formalization very often has positive
effects on investment (e.g., Lawry et al., 2017; Bambio & Bouayad
Agha, 2018; Goldstein et al, 2018; Smith, 2004). However, in cer-
tain contexts, the effects are comparatively weaker and, in some
cases, non-existent, among other reasons because informal or cus-
tomary arrangements already provided tenure security (Lawry
et al., 2017; Sitko et al., 2014; van den Brink, Bromley, &
Cochrane, 1994; Brasselle et al., 2002; Chimhowu & Woodhouse,
2006; Trebilcock & Veel, 2008). While property rights scholars tend
to highlight differences between continents and countries (e.g.,
Deininger & Feder, 2009; Sjaastad & Cousins, 2009; Lawry et al.,
2017), our research indicates potential for marked individual or
household diversity (see also Fort, 2008; Goldstein et al, 2018)
and within-country or sub-national variation. For example, our
findings are most certainly influenced by the fact that the JACs
are relatively strong in Puerto Asís; perceptions of tenure (in)secu-
rity are likely to be different in other parts of the country where the
opposite is true.5.2. Investments despite tenure informality
Illustrating the points made in the preceding paragraphs, many
of our interviewees invested significant amounts of labor-time and
money in their farms and communities, despite not having title
deeds or before receiving an adjudication resolution from the state.
Evidently, they saw other forms of tenure security, such as that
provided by the JACs, as sufficient protection. Here we provide just
a few examples.
One man estimated spending $15–18 million Colombian pesos
or COP, equivalent to 29–34 months of minimum wage earnings
(M.M.W.) in the late 2000s, establishing and maintaining 1 hectare
(ha) of black pepper.11 He used some of the earnings from his pep-11 We have used the monthly minimum wage figure to give the reader a better idea
of what the sums in pesos actually mean to peasant farmers in Colombia, many of
whom earn less than the legal minimum wage. We have done our best to adjust
figures so that they correspond to the year or approximate time period in question,
but actual values may vary.
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per crop (est. $2–3 million COP or 6 M.M.W.) to plant 2 ha of cacao.
He lost both crops due to the government’s anti-drug aerial fumiga-
tion campaigns. Later, he also invested about $10 million COP (20 M.
M.W.) in 2 ha of improved pasture with wire fencing. All of these
investments were made before 2020, when he received a title for a
small segment of his farm. We asked him whether he worried about
investing in land that he did not technically own. He said ‘‘no”,
explaining: ‘‘I knew that [land] was mine and, you know, the com-
munity is in charge and the JAC is the primordial government of a
vereda [. . .] I never saw a reason to be worried” (LQ2).
A couple from the same rural sub-district took out a $7 million
COP (14 M.M.W.) loan with the Agrarian Bank (despite not having a
land title) to plant 1.5 ha of cacao and borrowed another $5 million
COP (9 M.M.W.) from a family member to plant 0.5 ha of black pep-
per. They were forced to abandon both these crops. After five years
investing labor time and additional money in the cacao, they never
made any returns; the trees looked healthy, but the fruits were dry
and black inside. Meanwhile, the price of black pepper fell to $5000
COP (roughly equivalent to €1.65 in the late 2000s) per kilo, just
when they started producing. This same couple also established
circa 20 ha of improved pasture for cattle, which they estimated
cost about $3 million COP per ha or $60 million (116 M.M.W.) total.
In addition, they constructed a new house and, along with five
neighbors, paid for the digging of a dirt road (each family put in
$1.5 million COP or 1.8 M.M.W. in 2019) to improve access to their
farm. They too made all of these investments before 2020, when
they received an adjudication resolution for part of their land
(LQ3).
A farmer from a different area of Puerto Asís said he built up his
farm over 30 years, investing little by little. He now has 12 ha of
natural and improved cattle pasture with solar-powered electric
fencing, as well as chicken coups and pig sties, and 1 km of gravel
road. Much of this, including the road, he established before receiv-
ing a land title in the mid-2000s. ‘‘Weren’t you afraid of investing
in a farm without a title?”, we asked. ‘‘No, once you have pastures,
if they belong to you, then why would you – no [. . .] I knew well
the origins of the lands, they were first occupied as baldíos by my
own father, who sold to an uncle, and that uncle sold to a brother,
and that brother sold to me, so I knew where the lands came from”
(LQ4).
Most of the people we interviewed showed immense dedication
not only to their farms but also to the veredas of which they are
part. They have invested countless sums of money and days of
work in building village schools (LQ3, LQ6, I6), community meeting
halls (LQ1, LQ4, LQ5, LQ6), footpaths (LQ2, LQ3, LQ4, I6, I16), dirt
roads (LQ2, LQ3, LQ4, LQ5, LQ6, LQ7, LQ13) and bridges (LQ2,
LQ3, I16). Such local infrastructure is constructed and maintained
through mingas or collective labor events, plus monetary and in-
kind contributions, coordinated by the JACs. Many made/make
these investments even though they are/were not official property
owners (e.g., LQ2, LQ3, LQ5).
Summing up, campesinos in Puerto Asís show remarkable will-
ingness to invest in their farms and community infrastructure,
despite not having formal property rights. Arguably, this is because
informal and semiformal arrangements provide some degree of
tenure security. It is noteworthy that many of the people we inter-
viewed indeed suffered investment losses, but due to production
and market problems, as well as government counternarcotics
operations - not because of tenure informality.5.3. Coca cultivation: a relatively high-cost and high-risk endeavor
The other side of the argument - that coca growers are deterred
from investing in long-term licit projects because they lack formal
titles - is that coca is an ‘‘ideal crop” for those with ‘‘vague land
Table 2
Investment outlays and timeframes for various commercial crops grown in Puerto Asís.1
est. cost of establishing 1 ha
(initial investment, not
including regular production or
harvesting costs)
est. time until (first) harvest est. time between harvests
Coca 2.4–5 million COP 2 8–12 months (LQ1, I1, LQ3, LQ5) Every 60–90 days, depending on variety (LQ5, LQ1,
LQ3)
Cacao 2–3 million COP (LQ2)
5 million COP (LQ3)
4.9–6.7 million COP (Finagro,
2017, 2018a)
18 months (LQ2, LQ3)3
24 months (Finagro, 2017, 2018a)
Every 3 months (LQ15)
Cacao typically has two annual production peaks, one
much larger than the other, but can also provide
continual smaller harvests throughout the year,
depending on zone and crop management.4
Black pepper 15–18 million COP (LQ2)
8–10 million (LQ3)
20 million (LQ7)
15.1 million COP (Guerra, 2019,
pp. 42–43)
12–24 months (LQ2, LQ3)
20 months (Valdivieso, 2000)
24 months (Guerra, 2019, pp. 21)
Every 15–20 days (LQ2)
Every 3–4 months or 3 times a year, each harvest lasts
1.5 months and picking is done every 15 days (LQ15)




3 million COP (LQ3)
4.37 million - not including
transport of posts for enclosures
nor seeds (LQ1)
5 million COP (LQ2)




NOTE: these estimates do not
include the costs of acquiring
cattle.
Grazing can begin 90–120 days, or 3–4 months,
after planting (CIAT, 2018, p. 8) But it is typically
only profitable to sell cattle of more than 2–
3 years (LQ2).
Cattle reared for meat have a ‘‘cycle” of about
36 months (Finagro, 2018c)
N/A
Maize 2–2.5 million COP (CPGA, 2020)
1.12 million COP (Finagro,
2018b)
4 months (CPGA, 2020)
5 months (Finagro, 2018b)
N/A
Note: maize is an ‘‘annual” or short-term crop and
must be replanted after each harvest.
Please note: much of the data is specific to other regions of Colombia (FINAGRO) or general (Agronet, CIAT), as up-to-date and reliable information for/from lower Putumayo is
unavailable.
1 Coffee, which is sometimes compared to coca as a substitute crop, is not grown in Puerto Asís due to agro-ecological conditions in the municipality, and thus is not
included in the table.
2 This range is based on various estimates: 3.2 million, including the costs of hiring day laborers to help prepare and plant the land, plus ‘‘cheap” seeds and chemicals (LQ1);
3 million, if one already has the seeds (LQ2); 4.5 million, including the cost of the seeds, wages and food (farm-owners are usually expected to provide meals) for day laborers
(LQ3); 2.4 million just for seeds and wages, not including chemical inputs (LQ5); 5 million, including the costs of clearing the land, the seeds, wages and food for day laborers,
plus fertilizers (I1).
3 The estimated times between planting and first harvest for cacao provided by our interviewees are lower than the ‘standards’ quoted online. We consulted with Leonardo
Peláez Buitrago (September 2020), a specialist in cacao; he explained that grafted saplings do start bearing fruit about 18 months after planting, but trees don’t reach full
production until 4–6 years.
4 Tellingly, it is difficult to find information specific to Puerto Asís. This information was provided by the agronomist Leonardo Peláez Buitrago via personal communication.
12 Estimates of the first harvest vary from 15 (LQ3) to 70 (LQ5) arrobas (12.5 kilos)
per hectare. In the early stages, production increases harvest by harvest – for
example, from 50 arrobas of leaves per ha, to 100 at the second harvest, to 150 at the
third (I1). Eventually, these productivity gains flatline. Arrobas per hectare are
unlikely to increase above 400.
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for a number of reasons.
First, it is simply not true that ‘‘[c]oca grows naturally with min-
imal investment” (ibid). To establish a coca crop, ‘‘first you have to
prepare the land, then you have to plant, then you have to clean.
And the cleaning is consecutive; if you want your crop to grow
well, you have to keep it clean, because el monte [natural foliage]
grows really fast. So, it demands a lot of work” (LQ1). It’s not cheap
either. Our interviewees calculated that establishing a single hec-
tare of coca requires between $2.4 and $5 million COP (LQ1, LQ2,
LQ3, LQ5, I1), equivalent to between 2.9 and 6 M.M.W. in 2019,
depending on whether or not they have to buy the seeds. These
amounts may seem small to an outsider but are considerable from
the perspective of peasant farmers. According to one ex-cultivator,
planting coca ‘‘demands a lot of investment, and even more now
that things are so expensive [. . .] And one starts to recover just a
little bit of the work put in, maybe, by the third harvest” (LQ7).
Second, the assumption behind the above claim - that coca is an
‘‘ideal” crop for those with ‘‘vague land tenure” - is that people
without formal land titles face a higher risk of dispossession and
thus choose to cultivate crops that require comparatively smaller
investment outlays and timeframes. But the investments required
for coca production are higher than those required for many short-
term crops (such as maize – LQ1, LQ8) and are comparable to those
required for many long-term licit ventures, with the exception of9
black pepper, which is particularly costly (see Table 2). And while
it is certainly true that one among many reasons people grow coca
is that it provides relatively rapid returns, coca is not a short-term
crop. The same coca plant can remain commercially productive for
between 12 and 15 years (LQ9) and farmers have to wait at least
eight months (some interviewees said 12 months) before the first
harvest, which is very small.12 It typically takes 18–24 months (after
planting) for them to recover their initial investment (LQ1, I1, LQ3).
Thereafter, coca provides regular returns since leaves can be har-
vested every two to three months. But this doesn’t detract from
the fact that coca farmers are vulnerable to significant investment
loss, especially during the first two years.
Third and finally, the investment risks associated with coca pro-
duction are augmented by its illegality. As one ex-cultivator
explained: ‘‘That is the risk with coca. If they burn your laboratory
where you’re processing, if they take your gasoline, if they fumi-
gate [your crop], then you lose all that investment” (LQ1). Indeed,
countless farmers in Puerto Asís have been left in financial ruin fol-
lowing forced eradication.
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comparatively convenient crop for farmers without formal prop-
erty rights on the grounds that it involves small investment outlays
and timeframes and thus low monetary risks.6. Access to credit in the coca world
In this section we examine issues surrounding access to credit.
As noted above, many drug policy experts claim that land formal-
ization may serve counternarcotics aims by increasing access to
credit, which in turn enables farmers to invest in licit livelihoods.
This claim, which is often taken for granted, is problematic for at
least four reasons.
First, peasants’ access to credit is not necessarily conditioned on
the formalization of land ownership (Linh et al., 2019; Menkhoff
et al., 2010). In the case of Colombia specifically, the government’s
Agricultural Guarantee Fund (Fondo Agropecuario de Garantías) may
back as much as 80% of small farmers’ debts, enabling them to take
out loans without presenting a property title as collateral (F1;
Finagro, n.d). According to an employee of the Agrarian Bank in
Puerto Asís,13 the loan application process in his institution is rela-
tively simple: the applicant must present proof that she/he is a land-
holder, a national ID card, and meet with the Bank’s commercial
advisor who collects information on the project for which the loan
is sought. If the applicant does not have a title deed or adjudication
resolution, she/he can present a certificate of possession or a lease
contract instead (F1; see also Banco Agrario, 2012). This, he
explained, is especially important in Putumayo because ‘‘most prop-
erties do not have a deed. So, they have a purchase/sales agreement,
and that is where we work together with the Juntas [Community
Action Boards], which certify the producer’s possession of the land”
(F1).14
Some coca growers in Puerto Asís have indeed taken out loans
to invest in licit ventures, such as cattle ranching or black pepper
and cacao production, without using their farms as collateral (see
appendix 4 for data from interviews). Drawing from the survey
referred to earlier, 17 of the 68 farmers (or 25%) who did not have
a formal land title had borrowed money, mostly from the Agrarian
Bank. In comparison, 21 of 53 farmers (or 39.6%) who reported
having statutory property rights took out loans; however, we do
not know whether or not they actually used their land titles as col-
lateral (Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de Derechos de
Propiedad Agraria, 2019).
This leads us to another problem with the investment rationale
for land formalization. As evinced by research from various parts of
the world, providing farmers with formal property titles does not
necessarily increase their credit access/uptake (Carter & Olinto,
2003; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Migot-Adholla et al.,
1991; Trebilcock & Veel, 2008; Van Tassel, 2004; Lawry et al.,
2017). There are several other possible obstacles to credit access
or explanations for low uptake, such as rural credit market struc-
tures that promote concentration of access to the benefit of large
landowners (Carter & Olinto, 2003; for Colombia see Gutiérrez &
Marín, 2016) and the risk-averse behavior of peasants (Van
Tassel, 2004; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Trebilcock & Veel,
2008).
In the case of coca growers in Puerto Asís, our field work
revealed several important obstacles to credit access and reasons13 The state-owned Agrarian Bank, which is designed to provide financial services to
the rural sector, is the most important bank in the Colombian countryside; as of 2013,
it accounted for 96% of loans to small producers (DNP & Misión para la Transfor-
mación del Campo, 2014).
14 The importance of the JAC’s land certification role within this special credit
system was corroborated by an official from the Ministry of the Interior, charged with
overseeing the Community Action Boards at the national level (F8).
10for low uptake. While the government’s guarantee fund reduces
some barriers (mainly the land title or collateral barrier), informa-
tional and physical obstacles remain. As the employee of the Agrar-
ian Bank in Puerto Asís acknowledged, many small farmers are
unaware of the services provided by the bank, and the bank cannot
easily reach them: ‘‘There are people who find it quite difficult to
come to the bank, who have a farm 4, 5 or even 6 hours away,
by river or by trail, so it is very complicated” (F1). Poor internet
and phone signal compounds access problems. Interviewees con-
veyed a number of other issues, such as confusing information
about the bank’s programs; excessive paperwork; loans that do
not meet their requirements; exploitation by intermediaries; and
bank officials’ tendency to give preference to the well-off and their
reluctance to serve campesinos, even refusing to give them an
appointment (I20, LQ2, LQ4, LQ5, I10).
But what people mentioned repeatedly is the trouble they have
repaying loans with legal income sources. According to one inter-
viewee, getting credit is ‘‘easy”, but paying for it is not (LQ13).
Often the peasants’ bank-funded agricultural projects fail due to
a lack of buyers or low prices for their produce, high transport or
intermediary costs, climatic events or poor-quality land, govern-
ment aerial spraying of their crops/pastures, or taxation by armed
groups – making it difficult or impossible to repay the debt (LQ2,
LQ3, LQ5, LQ13, LQ14, I1, I20). That is why many peasants are
‘‘afraid of banks” (LQ12). Even if they seek credit and have a formal
land title, many prefer to use other documents (purchase/sales
agreements and certificates of possession) in their loan applica-
tions and not to use their farms as collateral (see appendix 4).
Following on from the above, the formalization of land tenure
does not necessarily lead to an increase in the willingness of illicit
crop growers to take out credit because licit livelihoods are so pre-
carious. Consider the following fragment from an interview with a
man who recently received a title for his farm:
(Interviewer: so, you’ve never taken out a loan?) No, and I am
not planning to because I am scared of those banks [. . . they
say] that the first two years are ‘dead’ [a grace period] but that’s
a lie [. . .] there are people in my vereda who are really in debt.
(Interviewer: but with the title you received, do you think you
will take out a loan?) How can I explain it - maybe if one has
an income with which to pay, okay, but if not [. . .] the bank
has taken a lot of lands because of that [. . .] When the voluntary
eradication [programs] arrived there were [projects for] black
pepper and cacao crops, cattle ranching, and fish farming. And
people took out loans with the bank - loans of $20 million, for
example, for [aquaculture] ponds. But, when it came down to
it, when they sold the cachama [a type of fish], everywhere
was inundated with cachama. The same with black pepper.
[. . . Also] cacao, black pepper that was lost due to the fumiga-
tion [. . .] a lot of people were left bankrupt because of those
credits (LQ2)
From this we derive our third point of contention: access to for-
mal credit does not necessarily make peasants less dependent on
illicit crops. In fact, as evidence from the field illustrates, it may
be the case that borrowing makes people more dependent on coca.
Several interviewees told us that they had to resort to coca money
to pay back the loan they had taken out to plant cacao or black pep-
per.15 One man joked that coca keeps the banks in Puerto Asís afloat
(LQ15). The following account is illustrative:
I took out [a loan] of about $15 million to plant cacao. I planted
two hectares of cacao, but cacao doesn’t give results. If I had
waited for the cacao to pay, I never would have paid. [. . . Fortu-
nately,] I didn’t invest it all in cacao. I invested in cattle and coca15 Farrel (1998) shows something similar for the Bolivian case.
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wouldn’t have paid [the loan. . .] There are people who invested
in 4 or 5 ha of cacao and they were not able to pay (LQ14).
Finally, the credit argument is based on an assumption that one
of the main obstacles to substitution is cocaleros’ lack of invest-
ment capital – hence the presumed need for bank loans.16 But par-
ticipation in the coca economy has actually enabled many peasants
to save and invest. Though Colombia’s cocaleros are certainly not
wealthy, their modest incomes are slightly higher than those of
other peasants, permitting them to fund their children’s education,
construct community and farm infrastructure, and acquire assets
such as vehicles and homes in town (Gutiérrez, 2020). Notably, some
have used their coca incomes to invest in legal agricultural ventures,
mostly cattle ranching, allowing them to gradually reduce their
dependence on coca production (LQ1, LQ7, LQ11, I1, I9).
However, as indicated above, people are reluctant to invest in
licit projects other than cattle ranching, and to give up coca
entirely, precisely because they know these projects are unlikely
to provide a reliable basic income. Supposing that most coca grow-
ers lack investment capital or lack sufficient funds (the latter being
likely) to establish a legal enterprise, access to credit would only
solve one item on a long list of impediments. In fact, unless other
issues are tackled, a rise in borrowing could create more problems
than it solves, perhaps even contributing to impoverishment and
land loss, if people use their property titles as collateral.
7. Discussion: alternative rationales for land formalization
The preceding sections questioned generalizations about the
benefits of land formalization, specifically as a counternarcotics
tool, and in particular those benefits related to the investment
rationale, which posits that formalizing property rights will foment
and facilitate investment in licit livelihoods by improving tenure
security and access to credit. And yet, one of the recurring
demands of peasant populations in Colombia, including those in
Puerto Asís, is precisely the formalization of land rights (LQ1,
LQ4, I16). Many are aware that informal and semi-formal land
tenure systems have limitations – in particular, when it comes to
negotiating with or defending against powerful external actors
and in the case of conflicts between rural subdistricts or different
communities.
In terms of the latter, not all land disputes can be solved
through local mechanisms. While indigenous cabildos, Afro com-
munity councils and (mestizo) peasant JACs are often very effective
at resolving land disputes within the communities they govern,
they do not have the authority and impartiality necessary to
resolve conflicts between communities – for example, over the
boundaries of collective ethnic territories, such as those described
by interviewees (I6, I7, I16). Ideally, state entities would act as a
disinterested arbiter between these different local authorities
and the communities they represent, though unfortunately this
doesn’t always happen in practice.17
In addition to limitations in terms of conflict resolution
between communities, informal and semi-formal land tenure insti-16 A quantitative study by Dávalos and Dávalos (2020) found smallholder house-
holds with access to formal credit are less likely to cultivate coca. However, the
authors do not explore the mechanisms behind this correlation, which may signal
something else altogether.
17 For example, peasant leaders in Valle del Guamuez expressed dissatisfaction with
the way state authorities have handled the territorial overlap between their
communities’ farms and indigenous territories. According to one interviewee, the
authorities did not investigate or attempt to clarify the boundaries. Instead, they
simply recommended that the campesino families whose farms are alleged to lie
within indigenous territory seek new plots of land elsewhere, on their own account
and with their own money (I16).
11tutions may also be inadequate protection against dispossession by
powerful external actors. Of course, not even a formal title can fully
safeguard against involuntary land loss. Nevertheless, on the
whole, those with adjudication resolutions and deeds are in a bet-
ter position than their counterparts without such documents.
Notably, some agrarian leaders in Puerto Asís used titling applica-
tions preemptively to stop a regional business elite from accumu-
lating more land in their area via coercive tactics. Also, a number of
interviewees reported that they sought formal titles for their lands
to defend against the government itself, armed actors, elites and
companies - most prominently, oil industry firms (see Appendix 2).
In Puerto Asís, one of the most significant threats of land loss
(total or partial/direct or indirect) comes from the oil industry.
Under Colombian law, all oil ventures are classified as ‘projects
of public utility and social interest’, meaning that the state can
expropriate land or force owners to give up use rights for these
investments. In this sense, formalization will not protect people
in Puerto Asís from one of the most critical menaces to their land
tenure security. Still, having a formal title does improve people’s
bargaining power, especially in terms of obtaining compensation
from the oil companies.
Summing up, although the formalization of property rights is
not an automatic guarantee for achieving increased investment
in legal livelihoods, it is in the Colombian context an important tool
for the defense of rural populations’ land rights and may help pre-
vent and resolve territorial disputes that cannot be easily
addressed by community-level authorities. Our concern is that
these potential formalization benefits may be jeopardized by inter-
ventions focused on suppressing illicit crop cultivation. For exam-
ple, when titling and registration fails to produce the expected
counternarcotics results, can we expect funding to be cut - or
worse still - the state to confiscate peasants’ land shortly after
granting them titles? Furthermore, treating land formalization like
a magic bullet may distract from other rural development needs in
drug-producing areas.
Land formalization, on its own, or even combined with superfi-
cial substitution projects that don’t address underlying structural
problems, is unlikely to significantly reduce dependence on coca
production in Puerto Asís. It’s worth recalling that 53 of the 121
farmers/PNIS signatories that participated in the 2019 survey con-
ducted by our research team reported that their names do appear
on the ‘certificate of freedom and tradition’ for their farm. If this
self-reporting is accurate, that means around 40% of those sur-
veyed already had a formal land title when they eradicated under
the PNIS program, implying that they continued cultivating or (re)
replanted coca after their land rights had been formalized. Our
interview research corroborates this: all interviewees (11) who
have a formal property title (and for whom we have relevant data)
continued with, initiated or returned to coca production after
receiving it (see supplement 2). This is sufficient grounds to ques-
tion the zero-replanting figure touted by government functionaries
in Colombia.
As explained by our interviewees, previous attempts to shift to
licit livelihoods have failed, among other reasons, because they
could not find outlets to sell their legal produce or because earn-
ings from these sales were so meagre (due to low prices, high
transport costs or cuts taken by intermediaries) they barely cov-
ered the costs of production, let alone their families’ basic needs.
Their stories highlight the want for things like quality long-term
rural extension services and the construction of diverse marketing
or distribution channels. It is noteworthy that not a single one of
our interviewees listed tenure insecurity or lack of access to credit
as an obstacle to participation in legal agricultural economies (see
appendix 5). Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that land for-
malization does meaningfully change people’s perceptions of
tenure security and that it does improve credit access. Many other
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Puerto Asís to shift away from coca cultivation.
8. Conclusion
Some observers rightly question policymakers’ focus on attack-
ing illicit drug supply, in particular at crop production level (e.g.,
Rydell & Everingham, 1994; Kramer et al. 2014; Buxton 2015).
Such interventions, even when ‘successful’ locally, apparently do
not reduce global drug use in the medium to long run – the alleged
aim of counternarcotics policy (see, e.g., IDPC, 2018). Nevertheless,
in this article we left these larger vital questions aside and engaged
with the mainstream drug policy literature on its own terms,
focusing on the addition of land formalization to the counternar-
cotics arsenal.
We problematized several arguments favoring the use of land
formalization as a counternarcotics strategy, specifically those
linked to the investment rationale. Evidence from one of Colom-
bia’s most important coca-producing municipalities shows that
many of these arguments stem from an inadequate understanding
of the world in which cocaleros are immersed. Thus, we conclude
that giving people formal property titles for their farms is not the
magic bullet some observers have made it out to be. Our objective,
however, was not to deny the need for land formalization in
regions with illicit crops. On the contrary, we consider that these
programs are important, but not for the reasons stated in the drug
policy literature.
More broadly, our work unveils two things. First, it is essential
for drug specialists to engage with research on rural development
and agrarian political economy. Some of the points we put forward
above are already known within these fields. So, it’s surprising that
several claims addressed in this article are still treated as universal
truisms by many. Second, farmers should be invited to participate
in the design and implementation of relevant policies and pro-
grams. If policymakers really want to overcome the disconnect
between their assumptions and the reality of the coca-growing














All interviews with the prefix ‘‘LQ” were semi-structured (around a land questionnaire) c
economy.
LQ1 Feb 6 2020 Puerto Asís 1 F
LQ2 Feb 7 2020 Puerto Asís 1 M
LQ3 Feb 8 2020 Puerto Asís 2 F
LQ4 Feb 8 2020 Puerto Asís 1 M
LQ5 Mar 5 2020 Puerto Asís 1 M
LQ6 Mar 7 2020 Puerto Asís 1 M
LQ7 Mar 8 2020 Puerto Asís 1 F
LQ8 Mar 10 2020 Puerto Asís 1 F
LQ9 Mar 10 2020 Puerto Asís 2 F
LQ10 Mar 10 2020 Puerto Asís 1 M
LQ11 Mar 10 2020 Puerto Asís 2 F
LQ12 Mar 12 2020 Puerto Asís 2 F
LQ13 Mar 12 2020 Puerto Asís 1 M
LQ14 Mar 12 2020 Puerto Asís 1 M
LQ15 Mar 13 2020 Puerto Asís 1 M
All interviews with the prefix ‘‘I”were relatively open-ended conversations (though we had
farmers, of the region.
I1 Sept 26 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M
I2 Aug 5 2018 Puerto Asís 1 F
I3 July 1 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M
12Data statement
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interviewees -specifically former and current coca producers- were
promised anonymity. Interview transcripts are difficult to fully
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and annexes, that draw on these interviews.Author credit
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onversations with farmers, currently or previously involved in Putumayo’s coca
Farmer, social org leader, JAC president, ex-coca producer
Farmer, JAC vice-president, coca producer
/M Farmers (couple), ex-coca producers
Farmer, ex-coca producer
Farmer, coca producer
Farmer, Afro community leader, ex-coca producer
JAC president, ex-coca producer
Elderly farmer, ex-coca producer
/M Farmers (couple), ex-coca producers
Farm administrator, ex-coca picker
/M Farmers (couple), ex-coca producers
/M Elderly farmers (couple), ex-coca producers
Elderly farmer, ex-coca producer
Farmer, coca producer
Farmer, coca producer
topics of interest, we did not have a list of specific questions) with inhabitants, mainly
Farmer, JAC vice-president, coca producer
















I4 July 1 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M Farmer, JAC vice-president, ex-coca producer
I5 Sept 11 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M Carpenter, coca picker, ex-coca producer
I6 Sept 11 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M Farmer, ex-coca producer
I7 Sept 11 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M Farmer, JAC secretary, coca producer
I8 Sept 12 2019 Puerto Asís 3 F/F/M All coca-pickers and inhabitants of the same rural subdistrict
I9 Sept 12, 2019 Puerto Asís 2 M/M Both farmers, JAC members and ex-coca producers –
inhabitants of the same rural subdistrict
I10 June 28 2019 Puerto Asís 1 F Farmer, JAC president, ex-coca producer
I11 July 2 2019 Puerto Asís 2 F/M Farmers (neighbors), one is a long-time social org leader, the
other an ex-coca producer
I12 June 30 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M Farmer, Afro community leader, ex-coca producer
I13 Mar 31 2019 Puerto Asís 4 F/M/M/M All JAC presidents of different rural subdistricts,
I14 Sept 14 2019 Valle del Guamuez 1 M Farmer, ex-coca producer
I15 Mar 29 2020 Puerto Asís 8+ F & M Group discussion with various inhabitants of the same rural
subdistrict.
I16 Sept 15 2019 Valle del Guamuez 4 F/M/M/M Farmers, inhabitants of the same rural district, all involved in
social orgs, one is a regional social leader, ex-coca producers
I17 Aug 5 2018 Puerto Asís 1 M Farmer, JAC president
I18 Sept 9 2019; Feb 5
2020; Mar 12 2020
Puerto Asís 1 M Farmer, JAC president, regional social leader
I19 Sept 26 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M Farmer, social org leader
I20 Feb 6 2020; Mar 10
2020
Puerto Asís 1 F Farmer, social org leader, JAC president, ex-coca producer
All interviews with the prefix ‘‘F” were with government or quasi-government functionaries.
F1 June 2 2020 Puerto Asís 1 M Employee of the State-owned Agrarian Bank
F2 Oct 9 2018 Bogotá 1 M Former PNIS coordinator in Putumayo
F3 Oct 18 2018 Bogotá 1 M Former director of land access at the National Land Agency
F4 May 24 2019 Bogotá 1 M Former PNIS director
F5 May 9 2018 Puerto Asís 2 M/M PNIS officials in Putumayo
F6 Sept 24 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M PNIS official in Putumayo
F7 Sept 25 2019 Puerto Asís 1 M PNIS official in Putumayo
F8 Oct 16 2018 Bogotá 1 M Director of community action at the Ministry of Interior
F9 July 2018 Puerto Asís 1 F Criminal law judge in Putumayo
F10 Sept 9 2019 Puerto Asís 1 F Notary Office functionary in Putumayo
F. Thomson, M. Parada-Hernández and C. Acero World Development 149 (2022) 105680Appendix 2. - Table based on interviewees’ responses to open-ended questions: ‘‘why did you request a title? or ‘‘why did/do you
think it was/is important to have a formal title?
± indicates that the person acquired their land via a formal transaction with a public deed – the rest solicited an adjudication resolution or title
for public lands.
* indicates that the person is not speaking about themselves, but rather in general or about their neighbors or other people from the rural
subdistrict.
GENERAL
To prove I am the owner/so I know the farm is mine/to have
property rights/to legalize ownership/to have a document/ to
ensure my land is not treated as ‘baldíos’ or public13LQ1, LQ2, LQ3, LQ4, LQ6, LQ7, LQ9±, LQ12, LQ13, LQ15±, I10TENURE SECURITY
To clarify boundaries/have a proper map and measurement of the
farm
LQ4, LQ6To protect my land from. . ./avoid it being taken by. . ./defend against. . .
Unspecified / people in general LQ6, LQ12, I10, LQ15±
Oil companies LQ1, LQ9, LQ2, I16*, I11*
State/Government LQ1, LQ2
Elites/large landowners/companies LQ1, I16
Armed actors LQ1
Neighbors LQ6
Neighboring indigenous communities I7
CREDIT/INVESTMENT RELATED
To access to credit LQ2, LQ4, LQ9±, LQ14, I5, I6, I16*(continued on next page)
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14Note: interestingly, none of those interviewees who reported this
as a reason for formalizing their land ownership had actually used
their title to solicit credit.To be able to participate in State programs/ because its required
for government investmentLQ2, LQ13, I11*To facilitate phytosanitary certification I10
OTHER
The government recommended I request a title/told me to do it. . . LQ3
Others (unspecified) recommended I request a title/said it was
important
LQ12, LQ13, LQ14Because the opportunity arose LQ3, LQ7, LQ13
Because titling was/is cost-free LQ3, LQ7
To ensure compensation from the oil companies. . . LQ3, I11*
Because they were going to construct a road (unexplained) I5Appendix 3. - Table based on interviewees’ responses to open-ended questions: ‘‘why didn’t you or your neighbors request a title? or
‘‘why don’t you or your neighbors have a title?
* indicates that the person is not speaking about themselves, but rather in general or about their neighbors or other people from the rural
subdistrict.
REASONS FOR NOT HAVING A FORMAL TITLE
They had more land than can be legally titled (over 90 ha) LQ2*
They were scared to request a title because their farm had coca . . . LQ1*, LQ2*
I/they didn’t think it was necessary or important; or feel the land is theirs anyway
and so don’t see the need
LQ7*, F10*, LQ14
Note: LQ14 has had more than 1 farm, the current
one is not titled.They didn’t want to pay taxes LQ7*, F10*
They found it difficult to travel to request a title I18*
They never went to collect the title from the relevant office I16*, I18*
My application was denied (reasons unclear) LQ5, I18
Their application was denied or was never resolved because of oil company
presence
I7*, I1*The government isn’t interested in ensuring people have legal titles I16*
The government ‘‘lost” the titles or couldn’t find the documents I16*, I18*Appendix 4. - Table with information on interviewees’ experiences with formal bank loansUsed a land title as collateral to obtain a loan LQ1, LQ11 - in the past, when they had a farm with a title deed
Took out a loan using a certificate of possession or purchase/
sales agreement
LQ3, LQ4, LQ6, LQ11, LQ13, LQ14, LQ15
LQ5 – says no document was required at all because the loan was via an
intermediaryTook out a loan using a certificate of possession or purchase/
sales agreement DESPITE having a formal property titleLQ4, LQ6, LQ13, LQ14, LQ15Tried and failed to obtain a bank loan I20- allegedly because the land title is in her husband’s name (note: her
husband has successfully taken out loans)
LQ2- he didn’t complete the application process because the bank was
asking for too many papers – reference letters from 4 different peopleUse of loan LQ1- to purchase cattle
LQ3- to plant cacao
LQ5- to purchase some tools (he can’t recall how he spent the rest)
LQ6- to build a house in town
LQ11- to fund cattle ranching (specifics undefined)
LQ12- to buy some animals
LQ13- to plant black pepper
LQ14- to plant cacao (and off the books, for cattle, coca and home
improvement)
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lawyer to get a family member out of prisonPayment of loan LQ1- yes, with some delays (funding source unspecified)
LQ3- they couldn’t pay because the cacao didn’t produce, they got a
reduction in the debt and paid with other funds (source unspecified)
LQ5- paid a reduced amount with PNIS money
LQ12- no, their farm was fumigated, and they lost their animals
LQ13- no, his pepper plants died, and he still has the debt years later
LQ14- yes, with coca income
LQ15- yes, with coca incomeMentioned access to credit as a rationale for -or potential
benefit of- land formalization.LQ2, LQ3, LQ4, LQ5, LQ9, LQ14
Note that none of these interviewees had actually used a formal land
title for a loan application, while LQ3, LQ4, LQ5 and LQ14 had taken out
credit without presenting a formal land title. Also, LQ2 mentioned on a
number of occasions that other farmers from his community had used
purchase/sales agreements or certificates of possession to secure a
loan.Appendix 5. - Table based on interviewees’ responses to open-ended questions about why their particular legal agricultural venture
failed, why people don’t participate in legal agricultural economies, and why it’s difficult for people to shift out of coca production.Lack of buyers/market/demand for legal produce (e.g. pigs, chickens, rice, plantain, black
pepper, sacha inchi or Amazonian peanut, Amazonian fruits – arazá, copoazú and cocona)15LQ2, LQ4, LQ5, LQ12, I11, I1, I2, I3, I9,
I16, I17, I12, I13, I14Lack of collection centers/processing plants (e.g. for transforming fruits, rice mill,
slaughterhouse for pigs, organic fertilizer factory)LQ2, LQ4, I11, I10, LQ5, I17, I13Low prices for legal produce/price fluctuations (e.g. plantain, maize, cacao, and black pepper) LQ1, LQ2, LQ3, LQ7, LQ12, I1, I2, I3, I12,
I14, I13Intermediaries take big cuts or don’t pay on time (e.g. plantain, chicken) LQ9, I10, I12, LQ4, I2, I13
Poor quality of soil/land isn’t very productive/land isn’t apt for much except coca LQ2, LQ4, LQ9, I10
Land fertility and other production problems due to aerial fumigation I4, I9, LQ1, LQ2, LQ6, LQ12, LQ13, I10
Other problems with production, such as pests or fungi, or poor harvests for unknown
reasons/other crops don’t produce well (e.g. maize, plantain, rice, and especially cacao)
LQ1, LQ2, LQ3, LQ4, LQ9, LQ12, LQ13,
LQ14, I1Lack of transport infrastructure, like roads or bridges/high cost and difficult of transporting
legal produce – especially bulky or delicate produce and perishables (e.g. pineapples,
limes, plantains, yucca, milk, cheese)LQ1, LQ3, LQ7, LQ9, I1, I2, I6, I10, I9, I12,
I13, I16, I17Lack of other public goods, such as electricity LQ7, I1
Lack of phytosanitary certificates or permissions for production and processing/confiscation
of legal produce by authorities (e.g. pigs, rice, panela or processed sugar cane, black
pepper)LQ4, I10, I11, I16, I15Difficulty of hiring day laborers for work other than coca harvesting/high cost of labor due to
coca economyLQ7, LQ11Coca cultivation has become the cultural norm/is what everyone knows how to do LQ1, I11Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105680.
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